London articulating what they believed was one of the primary causes for the continuation and severity of the Great Depression, private spending. They were deeply concerned by the fall in consumption at that time, and believed government action was necessary to counteract this fall in aggregate demand, " [t] he public interest in present conditions does not point towards private economy; to spend less money than we should like to do is not patriotic" (Macgregor et al.1932, 13) 
. They continued further,

Moreover, what is true of individuals acting singly is equally true of groups of individuals acting through local authorities. If the citizens of a town wish to build a swimming-bath, or a library, or a museum, they will not, by refraining from doing this, promote a wider national interest. They will be "martyrs by mistake" and, in their martyrdom, will be injuring others as well as themselves. Through their misdirected good will the mounting wave of unemployment will be lifted still higher.
While they thought most of their fellow economists would agree with them, they did anticipate some dissent. T.E. Gregory, F.A. von Hayek, Arnold Plant, and Lionel Robbins (Gregory et al. 1932) consumption and real investment. Instead, they argued that investment was crucial to lengthening the process of production. While increased consumption would fuel immediate consumption industries, it would not provide the incentive for productive long-term investments. Gregory et al. disagreed with Macgregor et al.'s insistence that government had both the capacity and the incentive to use deficit spending to increase aggregate demand. Gregory et al. (1932, 10) believed that " [i] f the Government wish to help revival, the right way for them to proceed is, not expenditure, but to abolish those restrictions on trade and the free movement of capital (including restrictions on new issues) which are at present impeding even the beginning of recovery."
The exchange on the pages of the Times of London Between Keynes (Macgregor 1932 ) and Hayek (Gregory 1932) was just the start of what was to become one of the most important public policy debates of the century; one that would continue until even the present day.
1 While Keynes's ideas had a deep influence on the economics profession, it arguably even had a bigger impact on public policy, where once adopted, never waned despite scholarly rejection. Keynes's deficit spending prescriptions effectively eliminated the budget constraint of public officials, engendering a dramatic jump in the growth of government deficit spending and the size of government in general Wagner, 2000[1977] ; Buchanan, Burton and Wagner, 1978; Hayek 1976, 90) . As Cochrane (2009) explains "[f] iscal stimulus can be great politics, at least in the short run. The beneficiaries of government largesse know who wrote them a check. The businesses and consumers who end up getting less credit, and the businesses that can't sell them products, can only blame 'the crisis,' and call up their congressmen to get their own stimulus."
It is important to note, as Skidelsky (2009, 103) points out, that many of Keynes's followers bastardized his theory in order to justify policies that even Keynes did not approved of (also see Leeson 1997 Leeson & 1999 . Towards the end of his life, even Keynes Employment, Interest and Money (General Theory) , a book that laid out the groundwork for the wide scale acceptance of his ideas , jump-starting the 'Keynesian Revolution,' a revolution in macroeconomic thought that rejected the classical view that markets are inherently self-correcting, instead holding that markets are in a constant state of employment disequilibrium and that government intervention is necessary to allow free markets to work (Keynes 1934) . Established economists at the time simply rejected any such notion of a revolution. As Frank Knight (1937) mentioned in his review, "I may as well state at the outset that the direct contention of the work seems to me quite unsubstantiated." Even Keynes's intellectual opponent, F.A. Hayek chose not to review the book, believing that it was just "…another tract for the time," and meant primarily for the "...momentary needs of policy" (Hayek 1966 (Hayek [1995 , 241). The older economists mostly rejected Keynes's ideas but the young took it and ran with it, making sure the debate continued throughout the century.
questioned the desirability of having government take more than 25% of national income (Skidelsky 2009, xvi) . Skidelsky (2009, 103) does admit though, that Keynes was partially at fault for this because, Keynes, in his hurry to get policies enacted, did not insist on close adherence to his theories (also see Leijonhufvud 1968) .
A few economists saw through the alluring Keynesian promises of growth inducing profligacy and levied a decisive critique of Keynesian economics and its followers, which became known as the 'New Economics.' Henry Hazlitt was one of the most thorough critics of Keynes, publishing both an almost line-by-line refutation of Keynes's General Theory (1959) and an edited volume of the critics of Keynesianism ([1960], 1995) . Despite the severe shortcomings found in the Keynesian model by its critics, revealing the fallacy of the Keynesian system, Keynesian ideas have witnessed a surge in popularity in the wake of the current financial crisis, especially in the political arena. Looking over the debates that occurred in the past and comparing them to those occurring today, one cannot help but get a feeling of déjà vu that we are, once again, embarking down the economically dangerous road of deficits, debt and debasement (see Smith 1776; Beaulier and Boettke 2009 ).
Nearly eight decades after the onset of these Keynesian ideas, the debate over the efficacy of public spending during economic downturns is once again in full swing. In the Despite the fact that these Keynesian ideas have once again gained prominence among even some notable economists, we would be reckless to discard the lessons from the past and re-embrace these ideas. Arguments made and the lessons learned have not been retained, and once again we are heading down the path of fiscal profligacy, and capricious government intervention. These misguided policy recommendations, which are all too quickly embraced by politicians eager to curry favor with special interest groups come at precisely the time when basic economics shows the need for fiscal austerity and political stability.
The remainder of this chapter will explain the evolution of the Keynesian ideas and show that some modern economists have adopted back the Keynesian tenants, almost wholesale, when the current financial crisis hit. We will examine the modern arguments advanced by Keynesians such as Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong, and demonstrate that they are essentially making the same arguments that were advanced in the past. We show that the critiques levied by Keynesian critics back in the 1950s are just as relevant and devastating to Keynesian propositions today as they were in the past but need to be more creatively presented in order to catch hold.
Keynesian History
John Maynard Keynes published his General Theory after the worst period of the Great Depression had ended and recovery had commenced. In the General Theory, Keynes holds that the economy is primarily in a state of unemployment equilibrium, rejecting the classical model of full equilibrium. Many of these ideas directly called into question the common beliefs in economics, not just at the time but even today. As Frank Knight (1937) noted, "…Mr. Keynes's own doctrines are, as he would proudly admit, among the notorious fallacies to combat which has been considered a main function of the teaching of economics."
The economy is mired in a chronic state of recession because of excess savings and thus, a lack of consumption and investment. According to Keynes, investment falls short of savings because of the decreasing Marginal Efficiency of Capital as more investment is made in the same homogenous capital, as well as the capriciousness of the determinates of the interest rates (Shackle 1973; Skidelsky 2010, 92) . The lack of consumption and investment in turn leads to unemployment and a slowdown in production, decreasing income and consumption even further. The only way out of this "paradox of thrift" is for government to run budget deficits during times of economic recession to increase consumption and investment. Even if the public money is not channeled into productive investments it would still do its job in jumpstarting consumption and production by creating jobs. Keynes argued that budget deficits could be afforded because they would later be made up by budget surpluses in better economic times.
In the wake of the General Theory came many attempts at interpreting Keynes's ideas, engendering an extensive body of newly inspired macroeconomic work. As Paul Samuelson (1988) observed, "[t] he Keynesian revolution was the most significant event in 20 th -century economic science." In the first few decades after the General Theory was published, the followers of Keynes sought not only to clarify what Keynes had said but also to understand and account for the counter-arguments being made at that time.
Essentially the early Keynesians believed the economy was inherently unstable and subject to shocks due to their belief that investment was erratically influenced by 'animal spirits,' and thus subject to huge swings based upon artificial considerations.
Once out of equilibrium, they believed, the economy would take a long time to recover on its own, if at all, as Keynes held that there was no inherent tendency back to full employment equilibrium in the free market. Thus, they argued that government intervention was required to restore effective aggregate demand in order to bring the economy back to full employment, and they believed that this was best achieved through fiscal, rather than monetary policy. As Keynes (1932, 60) wrote, "…there will be no means of escape from prolonged and perhaps interminable depression except by state intervention to promote and subsidise new investment."
By the 1950s many believed that Keynes and his followers had won the day. Samuelson (1955) showed that 90 percent of American economists accepted the 'neoclassical synthesis,' meaning they generally accepted the classical model for microeconomic issues and the Keynesian model for macroeconomic issues. In the neoclassical synthesis, macroeconomics takes precedence over microeconomics, especially during economic downturns because unless the economy is in macroeconomic balance, microeconomic market forces won't operate. While this last point is similar to the new classical perspective, it is important to note a point that Boettke (2009b) The massive inflation, and even stagflation, of the 1970s coupled with the theoretical contributions of the Monetarists and New Classical Economics led to a shift in macroeconomic thinking (Buchanan 2001 (Buchanan [1986 , 324). A renaissance of the market economy shifted the macroeconomic view of the role of government. They held that government intervention inhibited the self-correcting tendencies of the market. What was needed, especially in times of economic recession, was not more government intervention, but less government intervention. Keynesian theorists were forced back to their drawing boards because they had no way to incorporate these microeconomic foundations into their aggregated macroeconomic models while retaining the traditional Keynesian governmental panaceas they favored.
The New Keynesian theorists ended up adopting some key features of the New Classical School. Namely, they attempted to titivate the Keynesian models by incorporating microeconomic foundations. The New Keynesian literature has attempted to "search for rigorous and convincing models of wage and/or price stickiness based on maximizing behaviour and rational expectations" (Gordon 1990 ). So while Keynes described the economy as inherently out of equilibrium, with no tendency towards it, New Keynesians view the market as always tending towards equilibrium, just that certain rigidities prevent the market from equilibrating automatically, leaving some room for government intervention, but, as Cochrane (2009) Modern Keynesians have also attempted to justify stimulus policies based upon modern government capabilities. Just as Mises (1952, 69) said of Keynes and his General Theory, "[w] hat he really did was to write an apology for the prevailing policies of governments," so too are ideas of modern Keynesians. These theories hold that with advances in oversight and accountability practices, political pitfalls that have plagued past stimulus attempts, such as stimulus funds being directed to politically motivated projects rather than towards productive investments, can be avoided. The internet, better accountability standards and refined management techniques, they argue, can ensure that stimulus funds are funneled only to those projects that are ensured to meet a minimum requirement of productivity (Summers 2008 Despite some of the valiant attempts to address and account for past critiques of Keynesian ideas, when a crisis hits, any progress is thrown out the window in favor of the politically popular Keynesian solutions. Despite the long history of unanswered critiques, and failed attempts that forced even the old proponents of Keynesianism to reject old Keynesian tenants, the promise of economic recovery through fiscal profligacy proves too enticing to resist. Modern Keynesians, when it comes to economically trying times, are making the very same mistakes as their predecessors. In response to the current crisis they have offered up essentially the same Keynesian nostrums. Just like the Keynesians of yesterday they seek the miracle of turning stone into bread (Mises 1948) , but have failed to explain how this miracle is to happen. As many of the old critics of the Keynesian system have pointed out, they keep trying in vain. In this section we will demonstrate that the Keynesian framework failed to stand up to basic economic critiques in the past, and that modern manifestations of Keynesianism still fail this test, and thus are inappropriate and even pernicious, especially in a downturned economy.
The Framework
Little has been added to the traditional Keynesian framework since the 1950's. Despite its lackluster performance, and the inability of proponents to provide a microeconomic justification for it, stimulus is still the proffered solution for an economic downturn.
Larry directly makes the case for Keynesian remedies,
It is important to recognize that the ultimate consequences of stimulus for indebtedness depend critically on the macroeconomic conditions. When the economy is demand constrained, the impact of a dollar of tax cuts or expansionary investment will be at its highest and the impact on deficits at its lowest.
As Keynes et al. (Macgregor 1932) argue, the solution for economic woes cannot be found in the private economy and government must step in to boost consumption in order to put the economy on the path to recovery. This same argument is once again being used to argue for Keynesian inspired stimulus. Paul Krugman (2010a) argues,
Penny-pinching at a time like this isn't just cruel; it endangers the nation's future. And it doesn't even do much to reduce our future debt burden, because stinting on spending now threatens the economic recovery, and with it the hope for rising revenues.
Krugman's quote bears a close resemblance to Keynes (1932, 61) , Finally, Keynesian proponents must also assume that people do not take into consideration that the stimulus must be paid back eventually in the form of higher taxes.
In attempting to measure the multiplier effect of stimulus dollars during peacetime, Robert Barro (2009) got a number that was insignificantly different than zero, due to the fact that people foresee the growth in taxes to pay for the stimulus.
Mario Rizzo (2010b) questions the Keynesian tendency to disband economic theory during downturns, asking "[w]hen does the Keynesian moment end -and the ordinary laws of economics retake the stage?" Rizzo (2010c) also questions the ability of government to actually cut government spending during good economic times to make up for financial profligacy during economic downturns due to entrenched special interest groups. If there are any reductions, they "…will be half-measures taken half-heartedly.
So over the long run the size and scope of government will expand permanently" (Rizzo 2010d ). Freedman et al. (2010) find that without a political regime that ensures that deficits do not continue to grow once the economy improves, the long-run costs of deficit spending during a recession can exceed the short-run benefits.
The Keynesian model, at its best is still an over-simplified and overly aggregated schematic that is built upon highly idealized assumptions of benevolence and omniscience. A severe problem for Keynes, whose main criticisms of the classical school, according to his biographer Robert Skidelsky (2009, 82) , was that it "…used models which assumed certain things which did not occur in the real world…" As Hayek ([1966] Keynes also did not foresee the public choice issues that emerge in contemporary democratic settings in which public policy is actually formed and implemented, instead assuming that policy was crafted by a small group or relatively wise and enlightened people (Buchanan, Burton & Wagner 1978, 16) . The case for Keynesianism was also grounded in a closed economy model, and as Niall Ferguson (2009) points out, we are in "…a globalized world, where uncoordinated profligacy by national governments is more likely to generate bond-market and currency-market volatility than a return to growth."
The Keynesian model also fails to account for how government intervention in the economy distorts the incentives to invest. Not only did Keynesian inspired stimulus during the Great Depression fail to help the economy improve (Romer 2009b) , Keynesian policies adversely affected investment because businessmen were scared to undertake long-term projects with the uncertainty created by the constant political manipulation of the economy (Higgs, 1997 
The Causes of the Crisis
There is a wide range of explanations offered for the current financial crisis. Some of the most widely cited explanations include blaming complex and poorly understood financial instruments (Foster 2009 ) and private sector greed (Kotlikoff 2010, 31) . While arguments for greed and stupidity are tempting, they fail to explain why these components of human nature, which are omnipresent, all of a sudden lead to a financial meltdown, and thus fail to adequately explain the root causes, leading to misguided policy recommendations. Similarly, some explanations focus on the deregulation of the financial sector, which in turn let loose private sector greed (Skidelsky 2009, 44 Similarly, the lack, or insufficiency, of regulation is often advanced as an alternative, or contributing factor to the financial crisis as well ). Contrary to this claim, many economists have actually found contradictory, complex, and constantly changing regulation led to the financial industry troubles. Klein (2010) challenges this explanation by looking at some basic measures of the magnitude of financial regulation, such as the number of federal registry pages, the amount of federal spending on finance and banking regulation, as well as other metrics for the growth of government. Klein finds no trend to indicate that there actually was a period of decline, or even lack of growth, in government programs or financial regulation. The deregulation and free market sentiments were stronger in rhetoric than in actual practice. Levine (2010a) stresses that innovation is a constant in all industries, and that yes, it does have risks and sometimes leads to product misuse, but that claiming financial innovation inhibits economic growth is like claiming that medical research does not advance human health because sometimes drugs are abused. Financial innovation, just like innovation in any other sector, is a necessary component of economic growth.
Another explanation offered for the current crisis is large capital inflows from foreign nations, due to a global savings glut, lowered interest rates and led to a rise in mortgages and a decline in lending standards (Greenspan 2010 namely inflationary policies, policies that led to the housing bubble, and the regulatory regime.
Inflationary Policies
In response to the recession of 2001, the Federal Reserve pushed down the federal funds rate, the primary target rate of the Federal Reserve, from 6% in January of 2001, where it had hovered in between 4.5 and 6.5% since the end of 1994, to hover around 1% by around July of 2003, it's lowest rate in 40 years (Roberts, 2010) . It even reached negative rates when adjusted for inflation (FRED). The artificially low interest rates and inflation spurred investments for which the economy did not have real resources to complete. In other words, the cheap availability of loans encouraged entrepreneurs to collectively make investments that exceeded the resources of the economy, and the productive and technological capacities of the economy. While an un-manipulated interest rate would have risen, operating as a brake on the economy to curtail malinvestment and overinvestment, and would have allocated loanable funds to only their most valuable projects (Hayek 1975 (Hayek [1933 , 94), the artificially low interest rates prevented this rationing device from operating to choke off superfluous investment.
Taylor (2009) Inflation, as Hayek argued, is a lot more destructive than just a rise in the general price level. Inflation necessarily creates changes in relative prices, causing people to adjust their behavior, which in turn creates even more distortions that ripple through the economy, pushing the economy to a position that is inconsistent with the underlying preferences and technology. Much of the concerns of Keynesians, such as unemployment, are often caused by this inflationary distortion of relative prices. As Hayek (1974) noted in his Nobel lecture, "We have indeed good reason to believe that unemployment indicates that the structure of relative prices and wages has been distorted (usually by monopolistic or governmental price fixing), and that to restore equality between the demand and the supply of labour in all sectors changes of relative prices and some transfers of labour will be necessary."
The problem with inflation, and why it adversely affects relative prices, is that it ripples through the economy distorting the information signals which prices represent. Hayek (1945) carefully detailed the important role that prices play in the economy by transmitting dispersed knowledge of time and place to the relevant economic actors. As Hayek (1941, 64) Easy money policies fuel speculation and investments that fall beyond what would be encouraged by un-manipulated market prices. Savings represents the amount of future goods that consumers desire, and the interest rate adjusts to allocate the available savings among the competing investment projects.
Excessive investment in a stable monetary regime, as mentioned above, would be discouraged by rising interest rates. In an inflationary environment this check on investment never operates, and thus, more investment projects are undertaken then dictated by consumers' desires for future goods. This leads to an eventual economic bust as investors realize that they undertook investments for which consumers were not actually leaving unconsumed (i.e. saving) enough real resources for all of them to be carried out. A policy of accelerating inflation may delay this bust, but the heavy economic and thus political costs of increasing inflation will eventually force a shift in policy that will unmask the investment errors. During the bust resources will be channeled back into the projects that are in alignment with customer preferences and savings, absent further distortionary monetary or fiscal policy (see Garrison 2001) .
Inflation also bears additional costs, besides the relative price manipulations that undermine the epistemic function of prices. There are costs of avoiding inflation, which involve both the cost of tax lawyers and accounts, as well as the economic cost of investors refraining from particular investments, or altering their investment and consumption plans in order to obtain favorable tax treatment. There is the search for otherwise unproductive assets whose use lies solely in their ability to hold value during inflationary times. There are 'Shoe leather costs,' which are the costs associated with people having to run to the bank more frequently during inflationary times. In addition, there are also 'Menu costs' which comprise the costs associated with price changes necessitated by inflation, such as having to reprint menus in order to reflect higher prices.
Accountancy costs emerge because the relative price distortions don't equally effect all goods at the same time, so it undermines the accuracy of the information conveyed by financial statements. Accountancy costs are exacerbated by the fact that these distorted financial statements are then used to make future plans, meaning that inflationary distortions are carried forward. Finally, bouts of inflation also undermine the reliability of contracts, making private actors more wary of engaging in long-term contracts, as well as raising the costs of contract negotiation and enforcement.
Housing Bubble
The easy money and artificially low interest rates spurred a bubble in the housing sector, where the ten-city composite index realized an average annualized rate of return of 13% . In other words, the political purpose of these government sponsored enterprises was putting mortgages into the hands of people who would otherwise have been denied a mortgage in the free market due to insufficient income, an unstable job, or lack of assets (c.f. Block et. al 2008) . In fact, these agencies were given a target requirement for the number of loans they made to borrowers with below median income for the area, which rose to 55% in 2007 (HUD).
They accomplish this by participating in the secondary market for mortgages or by buying up bundled mortgages from banks, either through outright purchase or by swapping them for a mortgage-backed security that promises the originators a guaranteed rate of return. Both of these courses of action shelter the originating bank from the risks of its mortgages as the risk is transferred to Fannie and Freddie.
Fannie and Freddie were equipped with several privileges unavailable to market institutions in order to carry out this goal. One of the most favorable privileges was that Fannie and Freddie were implicitly backed by the U.S. taxpayers, meaning that while the stockholders maintained any gains, there was an implicit federal guarantee for any losses that resulted from the mortgages. Privatizing gains and socializing losses obviously in and of itself sets up the perverse incentives for excessive risk taking. Fannie and Freddie were also able to borrow funds at a rate that was only slightly above the federal funds rate, a rate that was significantly lower than the rate available to market institutions (Bernanke 2007) . With these special provisions, Fannie and Freddie were in control of a combined $1.8 trillion in assets by 2003 (Frame and White, 2005) . To put that in perspective, based purely upon assets, they were respectively the 2 nd and 3 rd largest companies in the U.S. at that time. Between 1998 and 2003 when the housing market began to soar, they were the most frequent buyers of loans (Roberts, 2010) . In return for these privileges, government ensured that they would have the ability to influence the policies of Fannie and Freddie through the presidential appointment of five members of both Fannie's and Freddie's board of directors and through the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Another factor that channeled overinvestment into the housing industry was tax code manipulation. To encourage house ownership, the U.S. government has kept an extremely popular deduction for mortgages, while renting has not received similar treatment (Norberg, 2009) . In 1997, home ownership was again encouraged through the tax code through the abolition of the capital gains tax on real estate investments, while it was maintained for other types of investments (Roberts, 2010) . Just this change in 1997 is estimated to have increased the number of home sold by 17% (Bajaj and Leonhardt, 2008 It is important to remember that the downturn is the recovery, the boom is where the problems emerge. The recession that results in the popping of the bubble is the market correcting itself. Thus as Rothbard (1962, 860) Thus, any attempts to use government to interfere with the market adjustments will make things worse. These are exactly the policies that the Keynesians prescribe to, and to which we now turn.
Regulatory Regime
During a recession, whenever laws and regulations become highly sensitive to political manipulation or popular opinion, oftentimes the first people blamed as the culprits are businessmen. When popular sentiments such as this are combined with a political administration that demonstrates a willingness to intervene in the economy in order to appease these sentiments, it creates a highly unpredictable business atmosphere. So precisely when political officials should be setting an environment in which entrepreneurs feel safe to undertake investments, they often create an atmosphere that discourages investment. Robert Higgs (1997) finds that this phenomena, known as 'regime uncertainty,' helps explain the magnitude and length of the Great Depression because of the constantly changing regulatory and legal framework in response to the recession. Policies that have been pursued before and during the current financial crisis have led to greater uncertainty for investors as well.
Ross Levine (2010b) finds that policymakers and regulators had a hand in creating conditions that led to the financial crisis by maintaining policies that encouraged destabilizing policies. Capital requirement regulations required investors to use the SEC created National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) for security ratings. The NRSRO has limited competition in the credit rating industry to just a few key players. In 2000 there were only three recognized agencies and no justification or list of criteria for becoming recognized (White, 2009) . By sheltering the credit ratings from competition, entry and innovation, these regulations reduced the reputational incentives of the protected rating agencies to accurately rate securities. Other policies such as the Recourse Act, which revised the Basel regulations, made it so banks had the incentive to hold mortgage-backed securities over individual mortgages and commercial loans by changing their relative capital reserve requirements (Friedman 2009; Roberts 2010) . As
Friedman (2009) stresses, regulation homogenizes, mandating what regulators believe to be prudent banking practices on the entire system. If the regulators are wrong, the whole system is at risk. One of those misguided policies that encouraged systematic risk was the de facto policy of the federal government to bailout large or politically connected firms over the past three decades (Roberts 2010) . Following an implicit policy to bail out firms if they suffer extreme losses, but allowing them to enjoy all upside profits, mollifies the prudence inspired by the profit and loss system, encouraging more risky behavior.
In addition to regulations that played a role in leading to the financial crisis, there has been a flux of new regulations after the initial onset of the financial crisis that have created uncertainty for investors. The Obama administration's continuing lambasting of profit-seeking businessmen has in particular created an atmosphere of uncertainty. Alan Meltzer (2010) , points to several factors that increased economic uncertainty in the wake of the start of the financial crisis. The passage of the healthcare bill produced uncertainty for employers, especially those considering hiring new employees, as there was significant doubt about the CBO's estimates of the total cost that would be borne by employers. In addition, the estimates for the healthcare bill also depended upon cutting spending in politically popular areas in the future and other generous assumptions, creating uncertainty about future tax hikes or inflation in order to fund it, along with rising uncertainty about future Social Security and Medicare obligations (Holtz-Eakin 2010). The auto bailouts, which transgressed the rule of law in order to hand out political favors to politically powerful unions over bondholders, put further doubts into the minds of investors (King Jr. 2009 are spending more money than we have ever spent before, and it does not work...We have never made good on our promises...after eight years of this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started...and an enormous debt, to boot" (Schram 2009 ). This lead Hazlitt (1995 Hazlitt ( [1960 , 10) to wonder, " [b] ut whatever the full explanation of the Keynesian cult, its existence is one of the greatest intellectual scandals of our age."
Conclusion: Lack of Creativity
In the progression of economic ideas, some ideas are discarded as theoretically unsound and empirically invalid. Keynesianism is one of those ideas that was found lacking and was therefore appropriately discarded. Yet, it has shown a bewildering tendency to reemerge during times of economic hardship, precisely when a return to basic economics is needed most. Its promises to turn stone into bread are too enticing to refrain from entertaining. As Peter stresses, "what we need in extraordinary times is simple economics; as simple economics is far from simple minded. In times of crisis it is too often assumed we need extraordinary and complex theories but what we really need is cool-headed and basic economic principles. As economists we tell our students in principles course that incentives matter and we should know this is true even in times of crisis. When we forget and discard the basic principles of economics we make the very crisis we wish to solve worse."
Throughout history fiscal profligacy and government interventionism have caused the decline and the downfall of many societies. While the theories that promise abundance out of scarcity are intoxicating, they are based upon false premises, which violate the fundamental lessons of basic economics. Heedless attempts to overturn the basic laws of economics with ungrounded Keynesian policies will only lead us down the dangerous path of deficits, debt and debasement.
That we find ourselves once again travelling down the road of deficits debt and debasement is not just a failure that can be pinned on new Keynesians who have failed to reject conclusions of Keynes's system that fail to pass basic microeconomic inspection.
Economists who have failed to explicate the theoretical and historical failure of Keynesianism in a fashion that would be understood by the economic profession, politicians, and the public are also to be blamed. The revival of recycled Keynesian ideas has not instigated a serious reformulation of the way in which basic economics is articulated and conveyed, but a simple duplication of arguments already rendered in the past. Both sides of the debate have suffered from a lack of intellectual creativity, as well as a failure to talk on the same terms.
Similar to the debate between Malthus and Ricardo (see Maclachlan 1999) , the debate between Keynesian proponents and opponents have not reached resolution primarily due to the lack of realization that they are using two fundamentally different styles of economic argument. While Keynes criticized the mathematization of economics and warned against the excessive reliance on econometrics, his aggregative formulas, which abstracted out of real essential elements in the economy, were highly translatable into mathematics and econometrics.
What is needed is a radical rethinking of the monetary institutions in society, and the binding rules on fiscal policies. Some of the foremost economic scholars of the 20 th century, Nobel Laureates F.A. Hayek, James M. Buchanan and Milton Friedman all tried to creatively seek ways to bind fiscal and monetary authorities, especially when these authorities act in concert, engendering fiscal profligacy and expansion of government.
Each one, in his own way, ended up rejecting the possibility of controlling government spending. Hayek (1976) proposed allowing competitive money issue. Friedman (2007) in an interview published posthumously, advocating handing the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve over to a computer. Finally, Buchanan (1962, 172) Given the monetary mischief and fiscal irresponsibility that has characterized modern social democratic societies, the choice before us is how to get back on a policy path of sound money and fiscal responsibility. This is a choice over rules and institutional structures. We are confronted, as Gerald O'Driscoll has put it, with the choice of either free banking, narrow banking, or no banking. What we cannot do is continue down our current policy path. Creative thought among the best and brightest political economists of our age must be directed on finding that set of rules which effectively bind the hands of the fiscal authority, and finding the alternative institutional arrangements for money and finance which will eliminate the ability of the state to engage in monetary mischief. In this regard, as in some many others, we cannot simply point backwards to the work of Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan, but we must begin with their work and push it forward in time to address our problems in our time.
This lack of creativity on both sides cannot be ignored. We have pointed out why we believe Keynesian ideas are the wrong way to go but this does not change the fact that the supporters of these ideas, then and now, are extremely smart people. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to explain why the ideas persist but what we do want to stress is that if we want to convince them of the flaws in the Keynesian system then neither of us can continue to make the same arguments that we have made in the past. We must push forward in new ways to strengthen our position.
The déjà vu we are currently living through is dangerous. Fortunately, but perhaps even more unnerving, is that it is also unnecessary. The lessons of the past should be learned before the same mistakes are made yet again. Political economy has the answers, if anyone is willing to listen.
